Algorithm for DNSSEC Trusted Key Rollover by Guette, Gilles et al.
HAL Id: hal-01501893
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01501893
Submitted on 4 Apr 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Algorithm for DNSSEC Trusted Key Rollover
Gilles Guette, Bernard Cousin, Fort David
To cite this version:
Gilles Guette, Bernard Cousin, Fort David. Algorithm for DNSSEC Trusted Key Rollover. Interna-
tional Conference on Information Networking (ICOIN). Jeju, Korea. January 31 - February 2, 2005,
Jan 2005, Jeju, South Korea. pp.679 - 688, ￿10.1007/978-3-540-30582-8_71￿. ￿hal-01501893￿
Algorithm for DNSSEC trusted key rollover
Gilles Guette  Bernard Cousin  and David Fort 
IRISA Campus de Beaulieu  Rennes CEDEX FRANCE
fgillesguette bernardcousin davidfortgirisafr
Abstract The Domain Name System Security Extensions DNSSEC	
architecture is based on public
key cryptography A secure DNS zone has
one or more keys and signs its resource records with these keys in order
to provide two security services data integrity and authentication These
services allow to protect DNS transactions and permit the detection of
attempted attacks on DNS
The DNSSEC validation process is based on the establishment of a chain
of trust between zones This chain needs a secure entry point a DNS zone
whose at least one key is trusted In this paper we study a critical prob

lem associated to the key rollover in DNSSEC the trusted keys rollover
problem We propose an algorithm that allows a resolver to update its
trusted keys automatically and in a secure way without any delay or any
break of the DNS service
  Introduction
During the last decade the Internet Engineering Task Force IETF has de
veloped the DNS security extensions DNSSEC The rst standard document
designing DNSSEC is the RFC 	
	 Eas Many RFCs and drafts have up
dated the RFC 	
	 and according to the experience given by implementations
this protocol is today enhanced ALMR AALa AALb
The DNSSEC architecture uses public key cryptography to provide integrity
and authentication of the DNS data Each node of the DNS tree called a zone
owns at least a key pair used to secure the zone records with digital signatures
In order to validate DNSSEC records a resolver builds a chain of trust Gie
by walking through the DNS tree from a secure entry point KSL typically a
top level zone to the zone queried Each secure entry point SEP is statically
congured in a resolver the resolver knows at least one key of the zone which is
taken as SEP this key is called a trusted key A resolver is able to build a chain
of trust if it owns a secure entry point for this query and if there are only secure
delegations from the secure entry point to the zone queried
The lifespan of keys used to secure DNS zone is not innite because old keys
become weak Consequently the zone keys must be renewed periodically that is
to say a new zone key is added to the zone le and an old one is deleted from
the zone le This process is called key rollover GC

Key rollover only updates keys on the name server resolvers that have con
gured the old key as trusted are not notied that this key has been deleted
Consequently the static key conguration in a resolver raises some problems of
consistency between keys deployed in a zone and trusted keys congured in a
resolver for this zone
In section  we present the notations use in this paper and the DNSSEC val
idation process Then in section 
 we describe the trusted key rollover problem
and nally we present our solution to this problem in section 
 The validation process in DNSSEC
  Notation
In this subsection are explained the notations used in the document
 A DNS domain X is the entire subtree beginning at the node X 
 A DNS zone is a node of the DNS tree A zone name is the concatenation of
the nodes label from its node to the root of the DNS tree A zone contains
all the not delegated DNS names ended by the zone name For example the
zone examplecom contains all the not delegated names Xexamplecom
where X can be composed by several labels
 A zone can delegate the responsability of a part of its names For example
the zone examplecom can delegate all the name ended by testexamplecom
to a new zone This zone is named the testexamplecom zone Fig 
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Figure DNS domain and DNS zone
 RR means Resource Record the basic data unit in the domain name system
each RR is associated to a DNS name Every RR are stored in a zone le
 Resource records with same name class and type form a RRset For example
the DNSKEY RRs of a zone form a DNSKEY RRset
 DNSKEY key is the RR which describes the key named key
 RRSIGXy is the RR which is the signature of the RR X generated with
the private part of key y
 A trusted key is the public part of a zone key which has been congured in
a resolver
 A Secure Entry Point is a zone for which the resolver has congured a trusted
key
   The DNS entities and denitions
Three entities with distinct role are present in the DNS architecture the name
server the resolver and the cache server see MocAL
The name server The name server is authoritative on a DNS zone It
stores resource records in the DNS zone le Every resource record is associated
to a DNS name The name server receives DNS queries on a DNS name and
answers with the resource records contained in its zone le
The resolver The resolver is the local entity that receives a request from
an application and sends a DNS queries to the appropriate name server After
having performed the name resolution the resolver sends the response back to
the application
The cache server The cache server is not authoritative on any zone The
scalability of DNS is based on the use of cache servers These cache servers only
forward queries and cache the responses when these are valids
  The DNSSEC Chain of Trust
DNS security extensions dene new resource records in order to store keys and
signatures needed to provide integrity and authentication
Each secured zone owns at least one zone key the public part of this key
is stored in a DNSKEY resource record The private part of this publickey
is kept secret and should be stored in a secure location The private part of
the key generates a digital signature for each resource record in the zone le
These signatures are stored in a RRSIG resource record A resource record is
considered valid when the verication of at least one of its associated RRSIG
RR is complete Figure  shows the signature verication process
In order to verify the signature of a resource record the resolver cyphers
the RRSIG RR with the public key contained in the DNSKEY RR of the zone
If the result of this operation Resource Record and the Resource Record
present in the DNS response message are the same the signature is veried The
resource record is valid
During the signature verication process the zone key is needed and must be
veried too In order to trust a zone key DNSSEC uses the DNStree model to
establish a chain of trust Gie beginning from a secure entry point KSL to
the queried zone To create this chain a veriable relation between child zone and
parent zone must exist this is the role of the Delegation Signer resource record
DS RR Gun
 This record stored in the parent zone contains information
allowing the authentication of one child zone key Figure 
 shows the validation
of a delegation
Resource Record
Cypher
=?
...
...
RRSIG(Resource Record)
key1
DNSKEY                          (key1)
RRSIG(key1)
key1
DNS answer message
Resource Record’
Resource Record
Figure The signature verication pro

cess
RRSIG(DS)
DS verification
Signature
DS RR
no
yes
is valid
The delegation
the DNSKEY
Signature
verification
DNSKEY RR
... parent key
...
from the child zone
DNSKEY            (key1)
DS identifies
RRSIG(key1)
key1
DNS answer message
from the parent zone
DNS answer message
The chain of trust
is broken
Figure The delegation verication pro

cess
Once the signature of the DS RR provided by the parent zone and the signa
ture of the DNSKEY provided by the child zone are veried the resolver checks
that information contained in one DS RR identies one key in the child zone If
one DS RR identies one DNSKEY RR in the child zone one link of the chain
of trust is built and the name resolution continue to secure the next link in the
DNS tree If there is no valid DS RR that identies one valid DNSKEY RR in
the child zone the chain of trust is broken and the name resolution is unsecure
The Delegation Signer model introduces a distinction between two types of
key the Zone Signing Key ZSK and the Key Signing Key KSK A ZSK signs
all types of record in the zone le and a KSK signs only the DNSKEY RRs
present in the zone le This distinction minimizes the burden produced when a
key is changed in the child zone because only KSKs have an associated DS RR
in the parent zone le Hence a DNSKEY RR can only be considered valid by
the verication of a signature generated by a KSK
 The trusted key rollover problem
The validation process of resource records based on the DNSSEC chain of trust
needs a secure entry point to start The RFC 	
	 Eas species that a
DNSSEC resolver must be congured with at least a public key which authen
ticates one zone as a secure entry point If DNSSEC is totally deployed on the
whole DNS tree only one secure entry point is sucient ie the root zone But
due to deployement constraints the current model that seems to emerge is an
island of security model with DNS zones and DNSSEC zones at the same time in
the DNS tree An island of security is a subtree of the DNS tree totally secured
with DNSSEC each zone of this subtree has a signed zone le Consequently
a resolver needs at least one secure entry point for the apex of each island of
security in order to perform secure name resolution for any zone
Moreover to maintain a good level of security zone keys have to be renewed
at regular intervals to prevent against key disclosure And consequently trusted
keys must be updated in resolvers to keep consistency between the key in the
zone le of a name server and the trusted key in the resolvers
Currently the rollover of a trusted key in the resolvers conguration le is
done manually by the administrator this implies risks of misconguration and
an interruption of the service between the moment the zone rolls its keys and
the moment the administrator changes the resolvers conguration le At the
present time there is no automated trusted key rollover When a zone decides
to renew one of its zone keys there is no mechanism to notify the resolvers that
this key is going to be removed from its zone le When a key is removed from its
zone le all resolvers that have congured this key as trusted fails all DNSSEC
validation using this key
Without an automated procedure to notify resolvers that a trusted key is
going to be removed name resolution can fail at any time even if a chain of
trust exists from the root to the resource record queried
In the next section we propose a modication of the DNSKEY resource
record and an algorithm to automatically update the trusted keys present in the
resolver conguration le
 A mechanism for trusted key rollover
 The DNSKEY resource record wire format
Figure  shows the DNSKEY resource record format
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Figure The DNSKEY resource record wire format
Only two bits of the Flags eld are used These bits are the seventh bit and
the fteenth bit Bit  of the Flags eld is the Zone Key ag If bit  is set
then the DNSKEY record holds a DNS zone key If bit  has value  then the
DNSKEY record holds some other type of DNS public key such as a public key
used by TKEY Eas Bit 	 of the Flags eld is the Secure Entry Point ag
described in KSL If bit 	 has value  then the DNSKEY record holds a
key intended for use as a secure entry point The other bits of the eld bits 
and  are reserved these bits must have value 
The Protocol eld species the algorithm allowed to use the DNSKEY RR
Since the publication of the RFC 
	 MR this eld must have value 

The Algorithm eld identies the public keys cryptographic algorithm and
determines the format of the Public Key eld that holds the public key material
The format depends on the algorithm of the key being stored
We propose to call the under changes bit the rst of the reserved bits of the
Flag eld and to give this bit the following meaning when this bit is set the
key contained in the DNSKEY RR is under changes and is going to be removed
from the DNS zone le
  The automated trusted key rollover algorithm
When a zone renewed one of its keys it sets the under changes bit in the
DNSKEY RR containing this key Piece of advice for the duration of the rollover
period must be found in KG
During the rollover period when a resolver asks for the DNSKEY RR it
retrieves the resource record with its under changes bit set Three distincts
periods could be dened for each key before the rollover of the key during the
rollover of the key and after the rollover of the key Before and after the rollover
the key is not under changes so the bit is not set During the rollover the under
changes bit is set to one
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Figure The best case resolver behavior
When a resolver receives a DNSKEY RR with the under changes bit set it
checks if this key is congured as trusted If this is not the case this key rollover
will have no impact on the resolver behavior and the resolver must continue
normally the current name resolution If the received key is a trusted key for
the resolver it tries to validate another key of the zone see section 
 If
it succeeds the old key is removed and the new key is added in the resolver
conguration le If the new key validation fails the resolver raises a warning
and the change in the resolvers conguration le must be made manually by
the administrator
On some resolvers requests on a given zone could be largely spaced out
more than one month for example Consequently a resolver can perform no
name resolution on a zone during the rollover period of a trusted key This
implies that the trusted key congured in such resolver may have been renewed
and removed from the zone le during this period of resolver inactivity
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Figure The complete resolver behavior
Figure  shows the two cases that can arise the resolver has another trusted
key belonging to an ancestors zone of the zone that has changed its zone key or
the resolver has not such a trusted key The left part of the Figure  is the best
case resolver behavior presented in Figure 	 the right part takes into account
the reception of a DNSKEY RR with the under changes bit not set
If the under changes bit is not set the resolver performs name resolution
normally If the name resolution fails the resolver must try to update its trusted
keys using another key for the name resolution If the resolver cannot performed
a DNSSEC resolution either because it has no valid trusted key or because the
resolution is not secure some data are retrieved from unsecured DNS zone the
resolver can not update its conguration le and the trusted key update must
be made manually
Algorithm presented on Figure  shows that in some cases a manual admin
istrative action is needed and a totally automated solution does not exist This
is due to possible misconguration in any DNS zone or due to the possibility for
a resolver to not have sent query to a zone during its rollover period and hence
to not have received the notication of key changes
 Security considerations and validation of a new trusted key
Automated update of trusted keys in a resolver is a critical mechanism for
DNSSEC and must be resistant to compromised key An attacker that owns
a compromised key can try to place new fake keys as trusted in a target resolver
using the automated trusted key rollover mechanism as describe now
Firstly the target resolver has a trusted key set including the compromised
key Then the attacker sends a forged message containing the compromised key
having the under changes bit set new fake keys and their signatures Finally
the resolver checks the signatures of the keys one of these keys is trusted but
compromised and validates some signatures The resolver discards the old key
and accepts the new fake keys sended by the attacker
To protect the automated trusted key update from this attack we dene a
requirement for the acceptance of a new key depending on the security level that
the resolvers administrator wants
To accept a new key the resolver checks the signatures of the DNSKEY
RRset it has received The normal validation process succeeds if at least one
signature is valid but this is not enough to ensure security because the com
promission of only one key allows the attack on the resolver to be fruitful So to
be resistant to key compromission the resolver must accept a new key only if k
signatures generated by the trusted key owns by the resolver for this zone are
valid If one of this signature is not correct the resolver rejects the new key
If the resolver has n trusted keys for a given zone our automated trusted
key rollover resists to n  k compromised keys Because an attacker that owns
n   k compromised key for this zone can only generate n   k valid signatures
and the resolver will accept new keys only if there are n valid signatures
Some local policy parameter may be dened by administrators to ensure a
sucient level of security This parameter denes the number of trusted keys an
administrator wants to congure to a given zone If an administrator wants a
low security level he sets this parameter to one and congures only one trusted
key for a zone But if he wants a higher security level he sets this parameter to
any number included between  and the number of keys present in this zone
Moreover a resolver removes or accepts keys as soon as the DNSKEY RRset
is received our method does not implies extra delays or time constraints for
resolvers or servers during the rollover period
 Related work
 Description
Recently Mike St Johns has published an IETF draft StJ describing a method
for automated trusted key rollover This draft denes a revocation bit in the
Flags eld of the DNSKEY resource record When this bit is set it means that
the key must be removed from resolvers trusted key set This revocation is
immediate Figure  shows the principles of this method
Firstly the resolver sends a query about a DNS name ① and receives DNSKEY
RR with the revocation bit set The revocation is immediate and the resolver
updates its trusted keys set ② To avoid attack when a key is compromised
the resolver starts a timer of 
 days and keeps a trace of all the keys that
signed the DNSKEY RRset ③ If the resolver received a response containing a
DNSKEY RRset without the new keys but validly signed before the expiration
of the timer the resolver considers this information as a proof that something
goes wrong attack or misconguration Consequently it stops the acceptance
of the new keys and resets the timer
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Figure	 Acceptation method with  days timer
In the same way if all the keys that have signed the DNSKEY RRset is
revoked before the timer expiration the resolver stops the acceptance of the
new keys Once the timer expires the next time the resolver receives a valid
DNSKEY RRset containing the new key it accepts this key as trusted ④
  Comparison
The major problem with the method described in the draft StJ is that it
introduces extra delay 
 days and requires a lot of management precaution
for the zone administrator Indeed this method implies a lot of constraints about
the minimal number of keys in a zone the number of trusted keys and the rollover
frequency due to the 
 days timer
Moreover with this method when a server creates a new key this key is
pending and can not be used during 
 days after its creation This implies that
if a zone owns n keys and rolls a keys every 
n  
days all resolvers will be unable
to update its trusted key set for this zone
Our method does not suer from this problem because acceptance and revo
cation of keys are made as soon as the DNSKEY RRset is received Our method
does not imply changes or constraints for the DNS authoritative server manage
ment
 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the trusted key rollover problem and we have
proposed a protocol modication and an algorithm for resolvers to solve the
trusted key rollover problem The automation of the trusted key rollover allows
to avoid break in the DNS service due to miscongurations and allows to mini
mize the work overload for administrators We have exposed that in some case
the trusted key rollover cannot be automated and the modication of the con
guration le must be done manually These cases arise seldom and are limited
to machines that do not perform name resolution during the rollover period
Moreover the algorithm described in this paper is resistant to compromised key
and places the choice of security level in the resolvers administrator side which
is a natural way to protect a resolver
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